

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 073572

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY

SUBJECT: NIMETZ-DIMITRIOU MEETING, MARCH 20

REF: STATE 59138

1. ON INSTRUCTIONS, CYPRUS AMBASSADOR DIMITRIOU CALLED ON
DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR NIMETZ MARCH 20 TO RELAY LENGTHY AND
DETAILED COMMENTS THAT PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU HAD MADE AFTER
READING DIMITRIOU'S ACCOUNT OF HIS MARCH 6 CONVERSATION
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WITH NIMETZ (REFTEL). COMMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) KYPRIANOU FELT STRONGLY THAT DENKTASH WAS BEING AS
INTRANSIGENT AS EVER AND THAT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF
REASONABLE PROPOSALS EMERGING--EVEN WITH PERSISTENT
TURKISH PRESSURE--AS LONG AS HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS.
THE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO BYPASS DENKTASH.

(B) KYPRIANOU BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS REASON FOR THE TURKS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN 1978 THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN 1974. IT WAS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE NOT CONTENT WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT TURKEY WAS EXPERIENCING SEVERE INTERNAL PROBLEMS. IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO GET UNDERWAY, IT WAS TO BE HOPED THAT ECEVIT WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE GREATER

CONCESSIONS THAN IN 1974.

(C) ON THE MECHANICS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT SUBMISSION OF THEIR PROPOSALS TO WALDHEIM, KYPRIANOU SAID THAT AN ORAL BRIEFING WOULD BE A SERIOUS DEVIATION FROM WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED, NAMELY THAT COMPLETE WRITTEN PROPOSALS WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHO WOULD THEN CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES. THIS POINT SHOULD BE STRESSED IN ANKARA.

(D) KYPRIANOU WAS CONCERNED THAT CONTINUAL U.S. ADVICE TO THE GOC TO CONSIDER THE NEW PROPOSALS VERY CAREFULLY SEEMED TO BEAR OUT THE THESIS THAT ECEVIT'S AIM WAS SIMPLY TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF PROGRESS. KYPRIANOU STRESSED THAT THE INITIAL TURKISH PROPOSALS MUST EMBODY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. ECEVIT WOULD BE LOCKED INTO WHATEVER HE PLACED ON THE TABLE FIRST, AND COULD NOT BE CONFIDENTIAL

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EXPECTED TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE FORTHCOMING AS NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESSED.

(E) KYPRIANOU REITERATED THE GOC'S SINCERE DESIRE TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THESE COULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN END IN THEMSELVES AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO PART IN ASSISTING TURKISH DESIGNS. PAST EXPERIENCES CAUSED THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ASSUME AN ATTITUDE OF RESERVATION TOWARDS THE TURKS.

(F) KYPRIANOU FELT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR PRINCIPLES SUCH AS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT TO BE QUALIFIED SO AS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCERNS THAT THEY MIGHT ONCE AGAIN BECOME A DISADVANTAGED MINORITY. GOC PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE CALLED FOR MOST REFUGEES TO BE RESETTLED IN TERRITORY THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD CEDE BACK; ONLY A SMALL NUMBER WOULD RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN THE FUTURE TURKISH CYPRIOT ZONE.

(G) KYPRIANOU TOOK EXCEPTION TO ANY SUGGESTION IT MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS BECAME FULLY ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING WITH EACH OTHER ONCE AGAIN.

THE CYPRIOT SITUATION WAS NOT COMPARABLE TO THAT IN THE U.S. AFTER THE CIVIL WAR, AND LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES HAD NEVER CAUSED FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THE DESIRE WAS STRONG AMONG BOTH GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO RE-ESTABLISH THE UNITY OF STATE AND PEOPLE.

(H) ON THE SUBJECT OF THE "EMBARGO", KYPRIANOU WISHED TO ASSURE US THAT IT WAS NOT THE GOC'S INTENTION TO INTERVENE IN INTERNAL U.S. AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, THE "EMBARGO" HAD

BEEN IMPOSED FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE, AND HE STORNGLY BELIEVED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE LIFTED UNTIL THIS PURPOSE HAD BEEN FULFILLED. HE STRESSED THAT PREMATURE LIFTING WOULD ONLY FORTIFY TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE AND WOULD PRODUCE
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AN ANTI-AMERICAN CLIMATE IN CREECE AND CYPRUS. KYPRIANOU UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

(I) KYPRIANOU COMMENTED THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT HIS INTENT TO "DETERMINE" US DECISIONS THROUGH HIS REACTION TO THE NEW TURKISH PROPOSALS. THESE SHOULD BE JUDGED, HE STRESSED, ACCORDING TO OBJECTIVE CRITERIA. AT THE SAME TIME, KYPRIANOU EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE U.S. WOULD WELCOME THE NEW PROPOSALS AS INDICATIONS OF PROGRESS REGARDLESS OF THEIR CONTENT.

(J) REFERRING TO NIMETZ' COMMENTS ON HIS INVESTITURE SPEECH, KYPRIANOU SAID THAT HIS CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICY HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT 1974 EVENTS, NOT AT THE PRESENT PERIOD. HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS REMARKS HAD IN FACT REPRESENTED QUITE THE REVERSE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM: HE HAD UNDERSCORED THE DECISIVE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN FOSTERING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, AND HE HAD SPECIFICALLY EXPRESSED HIS NATION'S GRATITUDE TO THE U.S. CONGRESS. KYPRIANOU ALSO WANTED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT--FOR THE FIRST TIME FOR A CYPRIOT LEADER--HE HAD IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED THE USSR FOR NOT DOING ALL THAT IT COULD TO PROMOTE A CYPRUS SOLUTION.

(K) KYPRIANOU WAS ANXIOUS ALSO TO KNOW WHETHER HE COULD EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

2. ON LAST POINT (PARA 1(K), NIMETZ SAID THAT A REPLY TO THE LETTER WOULD PROBABLY BE SENT WITHIN A WEEK OR SO, BUT THAT HE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR
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THE PRESIDENT TO SEE KYPRIANOU.

3. MORE GENERALLY, NIMETZ SAID THAT HE COULD AGREE WITH SOME OF THE COMMENTS THAT KYPRIANOU HAD MADE, FOR INSTANCE DENKTASH WAS AT TIMES DIFFICULT AND THE TURKS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO SUBMIT REASONABLE PROPOSALS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THE POINTS THAT THE TURKS HAD MADE TO HIM IN ANKARA, BUT HAD SIMPLY PASSED THESE ON TO DIMITRIOU OUT OF A DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL. NIMETZ CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, AGAINST EXPECTATIONS THAT A "PERFECT" SETTLEMENT COULD BE IMMEDIATELY ACHIEVED AND IMPLEMENTED; REALISM DICTATED THAT THIS WOULD BE A

GRADUAL, EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. ONE COULD NOT, FOR INSTANCE, EXPECT COMPLETE FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT TO BE IMMEDIATELY INSTITUTED.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. ROLE IN FOSTERING A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, NIMETZ REMINDED DIMITRIOU THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO BECOME TOO INVOLVED IN WHAT WERE ESSENTIALLY UN PROCEDURES. HOW TO JUDGE THE ANTICIPATED TURKISH PROPOSALS AND WHETHER TO RECONVENE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE MATTERS THAT WALDHEIM WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE "EMBARGO", NIMETZ STRESSED THAT THE U.S.--MORE SO THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY--HAD ACTIVELY PRESSED THE TURKS TO MOVE TOWARDS A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. THE TURKS IN FACT BELIEVED THAT WE HAD EXERTED TOO MUCH PRESSURE, AND WERE VERY SENSITIVE TO THIS.

5. CITING CONFLICTING PRESS REPORTS ON THE SUBJECT, DIMITRIOU ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY INFORMATION AS TO WHEN THE TURKISH PROPOSALS MIGHT BE SUBMITTED. NIMETZ REPLIED THAT THE TURKS HAD REVEALED TO US NEITHER THE TIMING NOR THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR PROPOSALS, AND TH'T HE DID NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ON EITHER SCORE. CERTAINLY WE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD NOT GO FORWARD AS
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PLANNED.

6. DIMITRIOU EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ALL THESE DELAYS WOULD AMOUNT TO A LOSS OF MOMENTUM, AS HAD SO OFTEN HAPPENED IN THE PAST. HE HAD HEARD THAT WALDHEIM WAS PLANNING AN OVERSEAS TRIP IN APRIL, AND THE FACT THAT TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE STILL APPARENTLY AT ODDS

ON THEIR PROPOSALS HARDLY AUGURED FOR PROMPT ACTION ON
THEIR PART.

7. NIMETZ NOTED THAT THE FACT THAT DISAGREEMENTS EXISTED
BETWEEN THE TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOULD NOT BE
VIEWED AS COMPLETELY DISCOURAGING; AFTER ALL, THIS WOULD
INDICATE THAT ONE SIDE WISHED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING.
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